"The option-ARM product is the key flagship product for our company." Kerry Killinger, CEO Washington Mutual, Inc. (generally known as "WaMu") called itself "the bank for everyday people" because it focused on consumers and small-to-medium-sized businesses. With this strategy, WaMu grew by the end of 2007 to be the nation's largest savings and loan in both assets ($328 billion) and revenues ($25.5 billion) -see Exhibit 1.
In 2004 WaMu was under considerable pressure to turn around its lagging mortgage division. A key initiative, beyond cost control, was to emphasize higher margin products (e.g., loans), most notably ARMs. In prepared remarks for the 2004 third-quarter conference call, CEO Kerry Killenger said:
"We are paying closer attention than ever to product mix to assess our profit by product and distribution channels, and exercise stronger controls than ever. The goal is to ensure that we are disciplined about originating higher margin product whenever we can. In this market our emphasis is ARM product origination, principally for our balance sheet. These ARMs helped the balance sheet to grow by $10.3 billion this past quarter."
The Option-ARM Strategy
During the same third-quarter 2004 conference call, Killinger said "The option-ARM product is the key flagship product for our company." The option-ARM is a variation of the ARM that allows the borrower 'options' such as paying the 'interest only,' or even making payments that are less than the interest on the loan. When this latter option is chosen, the principal amount owed by the borrower increases, which is referred to as "negative amortization" or "neg-am."
Option-ARMs proved extraordinarily popular during the housing boom. Between April 2004 and the end of 2007, WaMu underwrote $184.8 billion in option-ARMs and another $9.5 billion in ARMs that reset within a year. The company also earned fees for bundling these loans and selling them as mortgage-backed securities. 
Subprime Lending
From the bank's perspective, "subprime" loans are those made to borrowers who cannot get the best (prime) rates due to their poor financial position or credit rating. The bank charges a higher 2 "Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues securities that represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process known as securitization" (http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm). Mortgagebacked securities were typically purchased as low-risk investments by institutions such as banks, corporations, and pension funds. rate of interest on these loans to compensate for the higher default risk. Although WaMu appeared to exit the subprime lending business in 2003 when it sold Washington Mutual Finance to Citigroup, it retained a significant presence in the subprime market through its 1999 purchase of Long Beach Mortgage. As of early 2008, Long Beach Mortgage was one of the country's largest lenders to people with damaged credit. While Long Beach operated in all 50 states except Mississippi, its largest market by far was California (Exhibit 10).
In 2005, Long Beach Mortgage made more than one-quarter of all WaMu home-purchase loans. CEO Killinger expressed a desire to see that business grow faster than WaMu's traditional mortgage lending because it was more profitable: "We earn better margins in the subprime business because we're very efficient and have an advantage over some competitors" (Seattle Times, Nov. 13, 2005) . In prepared remarks for a conference call discussing WaMu's 2004 results, Senior Vice President and CFO Tom Casey said "First, we remain comfortable that we can achieve average asset growth in the 10 to 12% range. While we sell a significant portion of our ARM production into the secondary market, we still expect ARM retention to be a driver of asset growth. We also expect growth to come from planned increases in the home equity, multi-family, and nonprime lending."
In late 2005, WaMu planned to expand subprime lending along the East Coast taking subprime mortgages directly to consumers through its retail branches and home-loan offices. Analysts expressed concern about this strategy, e.g., "I hate the business," said Richard Bove, an analyst with Punk, Ziegel & Co. "Asking people who can't afford to buy something to pay up to buy that product is a concept that, for me, doesn't work." (Seattle Times, Nov. 13, 2005) .
Accounting for Loan Losses
When banks lend money, they expect the customer will repay the loan with interest according to the agreed-upon payment schedule. Inevitably though, some customers fail to meet this obligation and ultimately default on the loan. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, it is not permissible for banks to wait until customers default on their loans to recognize uncollectible accounts. Instead, management must estimate a periodic expense that anticipates loan defaults by customers. Although management cannot know which customers will not pay, it can make a reasonable estimate using models that predict loan defaults. The expense that results from this estimate reduces current period income and is typically called the "provision for loan losses." 5 To adjust the asset side of the balance sheet for this contingency, banks set up a contra-asset to Loans Receivable called Allowance for Loan Losses. 6 Its purpose is to reduce the balance of the asset, Loans Receivable, to the amount expected to be collected in the future, i.e., its net realizable value. Thus the journal entry for the periodic estimate of loan losses is: DR: Provision for loan losses (OE) xxx CR: Allowance for loan losses (contra A) xxx When an actual customer account is determined to be uncollectible, it is written off against the Allowance account as follows: DR: Allowance for loan losses (contra A) yyy CR: Loans receivable -acct #10101 (A) yyy
This journal entry removes customer loan #10101 from the books. Note that the expense associated with this bad debt was recorded when the original provision for loan losses was estimated, likely in an earlier period.
WaMu described its allowance for loan losses as follows:
The allowance for loan losses represents management's estimate of incurred credit losses inherent in the Company's loan portfolio as of the balance sheet date. The estimate of the allowance is based on a variety of factors, including past loan loss experience, the current credit profile of borrowers, adverse situations that have occurred that may affect a borrower's ability to meet his financial obligations, the estimated value of underlying collateral, general economic conditions, and the impact that changes in interest rates and unemployment levels have on a borrower's ability to repay adjustable-rate loans. Determining the appropriateness of the allowance is complex and requires judgment by management about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain. The Company maintains a comprehensive governance structure and a certification and validation process that is designed to support, among other things, the appropriateness of the estimate of the allowance for loan losses. Subsequent evaluations of the loan portfolio, in light of the factors then prevailing, may result in significant changes in the allowance for loan losses in future periods. 2007 10-K, MD&A, p. 63.
Evaluating WaMu's mortgage loans
The case questions below put you in the role of a financial analyst attempting to evaluate the quality of WaMu's mortgage portfolio and the adequacy of its loan loss provisions.
Figures and exhibits in the case include:
• Figure Exhibit 1
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